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ditions or restrict the duration of privately imposed use restrictions. 55
The weakness of legislation is that its retroactive effect may be limited.
Hence, while statutes may constitutionally terminate conditions which
have become obsolete because of changes in the character of the neighborhood or other similarly altered circumstances, the validity of an
attempt to .legislate an existing condition unlimited in time into one of
definite duration is questionable. Such legislation probably can have
only prospective effect.50 The existing judicial techniques for terminating
conditions subsequent are commendable and reasonably effective devices in
avoiding harsh forfeitures and preventing past actions from controlling
land use indefinitely. However, the traditional judicial reluctance to override precedent, the uncertainties of litigation, and the present inviolability
of determinable fees often result in the continuance of unwarranted restrictions long after the required use has become uneconomical and without present value to anyone. While legislation could remedy many of these
defects, statutes have been infrequent and may well be constitutionally
inapplicable to those restrictions in effect at the time of enactment.
Transferors of land desiring to place reasonable restrictions upon
its future use should consider carefully the implications of the device
selected. Unless a future windfall in the form of a forfeiture is contemplated, a covenant will ordinarily suffice and will avoid needless
penalties on the transferee. Moreover, in jurisdictions where rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter are non-alienable5 7 a covenant will
usually more nearly effectuate the transferor's intent and will redound
to his greater benefit. Restrictions beneficial to the land expressed in
terms of covenant -will survive conveyance to a stranger, 58 thus, often
increasing the value and marketability of the retained estate.

TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AND COMPETENCY
IN INDIANA
The ultimate objective of exclusionary rules of evidence is to admit
all reliable facts, thereby facilitating just disposition of a legal controversy, while rejecting all testimony so dubious as to render it repugnant
55. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1941) ; WALSH, Con.ditional Estates and Covenants Rnnninrg with the Land, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 162, 194

n.80 (1936) ; Legis., [1940] Wis. L. REv. 121 (1940).
56. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions,27 A.B.A.J. 737, 739 (1941) ; Goldstein,
supra note 13, at 275 n.103.
57. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
58.

WALSH,

op. cit. supra note 55, at 165.

NOTES
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to any systematic procedure for ascertaining truth. Practical, contemporary experience of the courts reveals that evidence emanating from certain sources is not to be trusted:1 Other exclusions have such remote
origins that their justifications have become obscure or entirely unintelligible.2 The latter repeatedly have been challenged by proponents of
the view that the jury should be permitted to hear all evidence relevant
to material issues and, with guidance from the court, determine its weight
3
and credibility.
In conflict with this desired liberality in the introduction of evidence
are the rules of competency and privilege. 4 Most witnesses are both
competent and compellable. An incompetent person, however, is one
ineligible to testify under any circumstances as a result of a legally
imposed disability. Furthermore, in many situations the law confers a
privilege enabling its holder to obstruct introduction of certain evidence.
In this event, a witness may testify only when the privilege has been
waived. Two classes universally held incompetent, insane and infants,
have long been distinguished by the courts as lacking intrinsic elements
of testimonial competency-ability to perceive, recollect, and narrate:
On the other hand, most privilege situations, of recent legislative origin,
are founded upon the extrinsic policy of perpetuating certain socially
desirable relationships, even though this necessitates foregoing introduction of additional testimony.
Except for an occasional minor amendment, existing statutory
rules governing competency and privilege in Indiana had all been estab1. Three elements constitute the practical foundation for exclusionary rules: a
human tendency to form impressions without reliable basis; a possibility that much of
the testimony in acrimonious litigation will be perverted; and a necessity to limit trials
to reasonable length by admitting only the most authoritative evidence. WIGmORE, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 8a (Student ed. 1935).
2. Historically, when Norman judges summoned jurors to participate in a trial,
it was not as triers of fact but as witnesses. They were neighbors of the litigants who
were presumably responsible men acquainted "with the facts. Over a period of years
the juror's function was completely reversed, so that he no longer contributed testimony,
but made a determination of the true facts from evidence produced by others. Due to
the judges' fear that legally-inexperienced individuals would be unduly influenced by
false, biased, or otherwise tainted testimony, they constructed a network of exclusionary
rules which allowed the jury to hear only the most trustworthy declarations. Thus,
witnesses were admitted only under strict limitations to assure their being well-qualified.
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE CC. I-IV (1898).
3. In hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, patent litigation,
admiralty trials, and some juvenile courts exclusionary rules are largely ignored. 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8c (3d ed. 1940).
4. These rules exist in all states and the federal courts, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a)
FED. R. CR. P. 26; CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. A. 1946, §§ 1880, 1881; ILL. REV. STAT. C.51,
§§ 2, 5 (1947); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 622.1, 622.4, 622.9, 622.10 (1950); MASs. ANN.
LAWS c. 233,

§20

PENAL CODE § 2445
TENN. ANN. CODE

(Michie, 1933); MICH. ComP. LAws §§ 617.62-617.68 (1948); N.Y.
(1944) ; OHro GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 11493, 11494, 11495 (Page, 1938);

§ 9978 (1934); Wis.

STAT.

§§ 325.16-325.22, 325.30 (1947).
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lished by the legislature as early as 1881. 5 In its final form, the statute
constituting the nucleus of the Indiana law characterizes as "incompetency" the absolute disability of insane and infants and also other
relationships more accurately designated "privilege." 6 Far from counteracting the legislature's confusion, the courts have further obscured
this provision with numerous conflicting interpretations. For example,
only four years after passage of the 1881 act, the Indiana Supreme Court,
referring to the physician-patient relationship, 'remarked: "Notwithstanding the absolute prohibitory form of our present statute, we think
it confers a privilege which the patient, for whose benefit the provision
5. The historical development of the Indiana statute is of interest in attempting to
detect some logical reason for the form in which the rules were finally established.
The first provision relating to competence was enacted in 1831, and prohibited Negroes,
Mulattoes, and Indians from testifying in any case in which a white man was a party.
Ind. Rev. Laws 1831, p. 407. This disqualification was removed in 1867, after the Civil
War and Emancipation Proclamation. In 1843 provisions were added making persons
competent to give evidence of gaming; establishing the competency of any person against
whom an offense had been committed; providing that belief in a Supreme Being should
-only affect credibility; permitting examination of infants or persons of "weak intellect"
to ascertain mental or moral capacity; and declaring that anyone convicted of an infamous
crime shall be incompetent. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1843, c. 54, §§ 42, 44; c. 40, §§ 257, 259, 261.
Several revisions occurred-in 1852: general ,moral character could be shown to affect
credibility; rebuttable presumption that children under ten are incompetent; removal of
incapacity due to crime or interest, but declaration of disability of a party or his spouse;
any fact previously creating a disability would hereafter affect credibility; husband and
wife incompetent witnesses for or against each other, and spouses. could not disclose
any communication from one to the other; provision that no attorney, physician, or
clergyman shall be allowed to reveal a confidential communication unless with consent
of the communicator; in criminal proceedings competent witnesses are those allowed to
testify in civil actions, the party injured, and accomplices when they consent. 2 Ind.
Rev. Stat. 1852, §§ 242, 239, 238, 243, 240, 241, 90. In 1852 the General Assembly first
accorded explicit recognition to privileged communications between parties in certain
enumerated relationships. In 1861 all of these privilege situations were combined in
one statutory provision; the legislature also declared that a party could generally be a
witness, and added the "Dead Man Statutes," excluding surviving parties in a suit
against a deceased's estate. Acts 1861, §§ 2 and 3, p. 51. The alterations made between
1861 and 1881 were the deletion of the disability of spouses to testify for or against
each other and the change in form from privilege to incompetency in the last four
relationships in the principal statute. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), c. 38, § 275.
6. "The following persons shall not be competent witnesses:
First. Persons insane at the time they are offered as witnesses, whether they have
been so adjudged or not.
Second. Children under ten (10) years of age, unless it appears that they understand the nature and obligation of an oath.
Third. Attorneys, as to confidential communications made to them in the course
of their professional business, and as to advice given in such cases.
Fourth. Physicians, as to matter communicated to them, as such, by patients in
the course of their professional business, or advice given in such cases.
Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made to them in course of
discipline enjoined by their respective churches.
Si.xth. Husband and wife, as to communications made to each other."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Burns, 1933).

NOTES
is made may claim or waive." 7 Thus the court allowed waiver, which is
peculiar to privilege, although the statute explicitly classified the relationship as one of incompetency. On the other hand, the Indiana courts have
specifically endorsed the extant statutory language as expressing "the
matured judgment of the legislative department of the state, which has
met the approval of succeeding legislatures during the forty years that
it has been in force... ."s The General Assembly thus far has acquiesced
in the inconsistent judicial constructions of this- ill-conceived legislative
pattern. 9
In addition to those inaugurated by statute, there are several
judicially created privileges. While the attributes of some of these rela.
tionships are well-established, others have not yet been clearly delineated
by the Indiana courts. Although seldom invoked, common law privileges
should not be disregarded in an examination of the law of privilege and
competency in Indiana. 10
Statutory Privilege and Competency. An early Indiana provision
in accord With the widespread trend toward abrogation of absolute exclusibnary rules is the 1843 enactment stating that absence of religious
belief should reflect only on a witness' credibility. 1 An individual is
thereby rendered capable of taking an oath whether he is an atheist, an
agnostic, or a child unversed in religious teachings. Another section of
the same enactment, providing for admission of proof of general -moral
character, also affects only credibility. Two early cases held that a
witness in a criminiu case cannot be impeached under this section by proof
of general moral character, especially when it consists of an isolated act
of bad conduct.' 2 In 1909, following passage of a corresponding rule of
7.
8.
9.
law in

Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885).
Kreager v. Kreager, 192 Ind. 242, 249, 135 N.E. 660, 662 (1922).
Not only does the principal section need revision, but the entire body of statutory
Indiana concerning admissibility of witnesses' testimony should receive careful

scrutiny.
10. Due to the widespread attention accorded self-incrimination and illegal search
and seizure in recent years, and because these immunities are based on principles differing
from those herein considered, they will be excluded from this discussion.
11. This conception attained constitutional status in 1852: "No person shall be
rendered incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinions on matters of religion."
IND. CoNsr. Art. I, § 7. It was also re-enacted by the 1852 legislature. IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 2-1724 (Burns, 1933). But see MODEL CODE

OF EVIDENCE, Rule 224 (1942), which
confers a privilege on a witness to prevent disclosure of his religious belief even to
affect his credibility. This principle apparently is in accord with the motive underlying

the Indiana constitutional mandate.
For comment on religious beliefs as affecting witnesses, see Swvancara, liquity in
the Name of Justice, 18 VA. L. REv. 415 (1932) ; Swancara, Non-Religious Witnesses,
8 Wis. L. Rxv. 49 (1932); and Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious

Minorities and Non-Believers in the United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659 (1930).
12. Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124 (1874) ; Farley v. State, 57 Ind. 331, 334 (1877).
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criminal procedure, Dottererv. State, thoroughly discussing both acts and
the early precedents, observed that the criminal statute was doubtless
enacted with an intent of overruling the two early cases..' 3 Thus, Dotterer
indicated that the credibility of a witness may be impugned in a civil oir
criminal action by demonstrating that he has been previously arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted of a similar offense.
Previous conviction also is significant under another section of the
Indiana statutes. 1 4 At common law any person who had been convicted
of an infamous crime and sentenced therefor was disqualified as a witness. Treason, felonies and crimen falsi were in this category; the true
test of infamy was whether the crime displayed such depravity or disposition to impede justice on the part of its perpetrator as to create a strong
presumption against his truthfulness under oath. 15 This theory, that
veracity can hardly be expected from a person of such low moral qualities,
supported the doctrine until the time of Bentham. His vehement attack
upon its fallacies led to virtual disappearance of the disqualification.
Some jurisdictions still retain it, however, as to certain offenses, such as
perjury.' 6 Many provide that any previous conviction shall go to the
credibility of the witness." 7 The latter view was adopted by the Indiana
legislature in a provision included in the revised statutes of 1852, which
superseded the act of 1843 defining infamous crimes and rendering those
convicted incompetent.""
13. 172 Ind. 357, 361-365, 88 N.E. 689, 691-693 (1909).
14. "Any fact which might, heretofore, be shown to render a witness incompetent,
may be hereafter shown to affect his credibility." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1725 (Burns,
1933).
Prosecution; indictment, or arrest are insufficient to bring a witness within the
bounds of the statute; the judgment of the court, not the verdict of the jury, rendered an
accused legally infamous. Petro v. State, 204 Ind. 401, 411-416, 184 N.E. 710, 713-715
(1932) ; Canada v. Curry, 73 Ind. 246, 249 (1881) ; Dawley v. State, 4 Ind. 128 (1853).
The court in the Petro case overruled Vancleave v. State, 150 Ind. 273, 49 N.E. 1060
(1897) and Tosser v. State, 200 Itid. 156, 162 N.E. 49 (1928), to the extent that they
allowed evidence of arrest or charge to affect credibility of a witness. See Note, 9 IND.
L.J. 543 (1934).
This provision has been held not to prevent the court from compelling a witness
to answer as to matters that may disgrace or humiliate him. South Bend v. Hardy, 98
Ind. 577 (1884) ; Bessette v. State, 101 Ind. 85 (1884).
15. 58 Amt. JUR., WITNESSES § 138.
16. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.06 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.090 (1946); MD. ANN.
CODE Art. 35, § 1 (1939); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2315 (1942).
17. E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. A. 1946, § 1879; ILL. STAT. ANN. § 37.720 (Jones
Cum. Supp. f950); MicH. Co i-. LAWS §617.63 (1948); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 2444
(1944) ; VA. CODE § 19-239 (1950).
18. See IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1725 (Burns, 1933), Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind.
688, 692, 51 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1943). Several cases upholding the statute construed it
as removing all objections to the competency of a witness by reason of conviction of a
crime. Glenn v. Clore, 42 Ind. 60, 61 (1873); Jeffersonville, M. & I. R.R. v. Riley, 39
Ind. 568, 588 (1872) ; Muir v. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187, 190 (1856) ; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind.
326, 330 (1855).

NOTES
In Indiana "competency to testify is the rule, and incompetency is
the exception. No person will be excluded from testifying, and no testimony be rejected, unless within the inhibition [prohibition?] of the
statute."' 9 These statements allude to the primary competency statute,
which prescribes the testimonial capacity of witnesses in general, and
especially of parties and persons interested in a suit. 20 This section is
a preamble to the exceptive clauses which have provoked frequent litigation and considerable perplexity in Indiana.
All jurisdictions declare that persons insane or infants at the time
they are offered as witnesses are prima facie incompetent. It is well
settled in Indiana that an adverse party may assert incompetency due to
insanity. Examination of the witness to determine this issue then devolves upon the trial judge. 2 1 If the witness is found competent, the
credibility of his testimony is left to the jury.2 2 Under the prevailing
rule, the judgment of the trial court on the question of competency will
not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. 23
Although Indiana courts have strictly adhered to a narrow construction of the statutory rule, most jurisdictions hold that unsoundness
of mind will not render a person incompetent if he has sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and to be capable of
presenting a correct account of the matters he has seen or heard relevant
to the questions at issue. 24 The latter is more likely to facilitate discovery
19. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 86 Ind. App. 326, 328, 157 N.E. 448
(1927); Payne v. Larter, 40 Ind. App. 425, 426, 82 N.E. 96 (1907) ; Haughton v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 165 Ind.'32, 35, 73 N.E. 592 (1905) ; Jordan v. State, 142 Ind. 422, 424,
41 N.E.817, 818 (1895).
20. "All persons, whether parties to or interested in the suit, shall be competent
witnesses in a civil action or proceeding except as herein otherwise provided." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-1713 (Burns, 1933).
21. Courts no longer consider the insane entirely incapable of testifying. Duncan v.
Welty, 20 Ind. 44 (1863) ; Carpenter v. Dame, 10 Ind. 125, 131 (1858) ; 58 Am. JuR.,
WITNEssEs §§ 208-213. See Maguire and Epstein, Rules of Ezidenwe in Preliminary Controversics as to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101 (1927).
The fact that a witness had been previously adjudged insane is not controlling; the
important factor is his capacity at the time of the trial to recollect and clearly relate
his observations. Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 35 N.E. 1 (1893); Breedlove v.
Bundy, 96 Ind. 319, 324 (1884). Where a proposed witness is adjudged insane after
the trial starts, however, or where he is under guardianship at the time of the trial, he
has been held incompetent to testify. Hart v. Miller, 29 Ind. App. 222, 244-248, 64 N.E.
239, 246-248 (1902); Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 339, 10 N.E. 270, 281 (1886). Deaf
and dumb persons who can communicate with signs are competent. Skaggs v. State, 108
Ind 53, 56, 8 N.E. 695, 697 (1886) ; Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295 (Ind. 1840).
22. Holfhes v. State, 88 Ind. 145, 147 (1882).
23. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895); Lanier v. Bryan, 184 N.C.
235, 114 S.E. 6 (1922) ; Shannon v. Swanson, 208 Ill. 52, 69 N.W. 869 (1904); People
v. Walker, 113 Mich. 367, 71 N.E. 641 (1897).
24. E.g., People v. Enright, 256 Ill. 221, 99 N.E. 936 (1912) ; Barker v. Washburn,
200 N.Y. 28, 93 N.E. 958 (1911) ; Mead v. Harris, 101 Mich. 585, 60 N.W. 284 (1894).
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of the truth than is vigorous application of the Indiana rule that insane
persons cannot testify.
Where a child under ten is offered as a witness, however, an Indiana
rule, liberal by comparison with the insanity decisions, asserts his com''25
petency if he understands the "nature and obligation of an oath.
Passing over a purely mechanical determination of the infant's age, the
courts can proceed to a more meaningful inquiry into his mental capacity. 26 A more prevalent view relaxes this rule as to an infant's
competency even further, positing his capacity on his intelligence, ability
to recall and narrate the facts, and perception of a duty to tell the
truth.2 7 Since the purpose of admitting testimony is to elicit facts, it is
probable that the inflexible Indiana requirement promotes suppression rather than discovery of the trzuth. Before rejecting the progressive
view as an inducement to unreliable evidence, it should be recognized
that the jury has the prerogative to determine the weight to be given
a witness' testimony. In accord with this suggestion is one offered, surprisingly enough, in an old Indiana opinion which proposed use of
scientific methods to accurately determine capacity to testify. 28 If accepted in determining competency of infants, such a suggestion would
precipitate the use of psychological tests to disclose their intelligence,
memory and ability to communicate recollections, thus obviating reliance
29
on the decision of a judge unskilled in such matters.
Despite statutory characterization of the attorney-client relation as
one imposing an absolute disqualification, the attorney is a competent
witness. Since the courts have tacitly repudiated the statutory language
25. Age at the time of the trial and not the date of the observed transaction
determines competency. Foster, Adm'r. v. Honan, 22 Ind. App. 252, 259, 53 N.E. 667,
669 (1898) ; if, however, at the time of the transaction the child was too young to
observe and remember what occurred, he should be disqualified.
26. The court must act on its own judgment upon a public examination; the
judge cannot appoint referees to determine competency of a child. Simpson v. State,
31 Ind. 90 (1869). Presumption favors the decision of the trial court, since the judge
has the proposed witness before him and is able to estimate capacity from his deportment
and the manner in which he replies to questioning. Blackwell v. State, 11 Ind. 196

(1858).
27. Commonwealth v. Allabaugh, 162 Pa. Super. 490, 58 A.2d 184 (1948), noted,
22 TEMP. L.Q. 234 (1948). For an analysis of decisions supporting this modern doctrine
see Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-the Competency
of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928).
Michigan permits children to testify on a
promise to tell the truth. MICH. Coms'. LAws § 617.68 (1948).
28. Nave's Adm'r. v. Williams, 22 Ind. 368 (1864); this case concerned the determination of competency of witnesses who were allegedly mulattoes.
-'
29. Cf. R. v. Reynolds, 1 All England Rep. 335, (1950), noted, 13 MoD. L. REv.
235 (1950). See Note, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950), advocating use of psycholbgical tests to
establish credibility of prosecutrix in rape cases.

NOTES
and properly construed the situation as one of privilege, the client may
object to admission of his confidential communications to counsel.a 0 The
31
oldest testimonial privilege, it originated in England as early as 1577.
In deference to the oath and honor of the barrister, the tribunal did not
require him to disclose his clieht's confidences. While the privilege has
endured, the emphasis has shifted to indulgence of the client's interest,
as evidenced by Judge Shaw's opinion in Hatton v. Robinson: "So
numerous and complex are the laws by which the rights and duties of
citizens are governed, so important is it that they should be permitted
to avail themselves of the superior skill and learning of those who are
sanctioned by the law as its ministers and expounders, . . .that the law
has considered it the wisest policy to encourage and sanction this confidence, by requiring that . . . [as to confidential communications] the
32
mouth of the attorney shall be forever sealed."
33
Bower's Administrator v. Briggs poses an interesting question.
Two defendants to a suit on.a promissory note consulted plaintiff's attorney regarding a matter primarily of importance to the former. Confronted with the question whether an attorney's advice may be solicited
by adverse parties to the sahie litigation, the court perceived nothing
reprehensible in the course pursued by the lawyer since he merely rendered
services concerning defendants' right inter sese. As to the subject of defendants' inquiry, their communications were privileged. 34 This decision
adopts a sound approach. For the court to scrutinize the circumstances
of each case to determine whether the communicator intended his conversation to be confidential and whether the particular relationship is
one deserving judicial asylum is to adhere to the policy underlying the
privilege.
30. Brown v. Clow, 158 Ind. 403, 62 N.E. 1006 (1901) and cases cited; Fluty v.
State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E.2d 565 (1946). The attorney must be consulted in his professional capacity, with a view towards obtaining advice. McDonald v. McDonald, 142
Ind. 55, 41 N.E. 336 (1895). A suit need not be pending, however, nor is it necessary
that a fee be paid. Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112 (1873) ; Reed v. Smith, 2 Ind. 160
.(1850). The communication must be made in confidence, not within the hearing of third
parties. Hanlon v. Doherty, 109 Ind. 37, 9 N.E. 782 (1886). Communication to an
attorney acting merely as a scrivener or notary public is not confidential. Borum v.
Fouts, 15 Ind. 50 (1860) ; Lukin v. Halderson, 24 Ind. App. 645, 57 N.E. 254 (1899).
31. Berd v. Lovelace, Cory 88 (1577) ; Kelway v. Kelway, Cory 127 (1580)
Dennis v. Codrington, Cory 143 (1580).
32. 14 Pick. 416,(Mass. 1833). For history and development of the policy underlying this privilege see 16 CALIF. L. Rav. 487 (1928).
33. 20 Ind. 139 (1863).
34. This holding is supported by 58- Am. JuR., WITNESSEs § 496. Professor Wigmore, however, claims that a communication to an attorney consulted by adverse parties is
clearly without the privilege, since no confidence is reposed in the lawyer. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2312. Cf. Scranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68 (1875).
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Although denied the right to testify as to confidential communications, an attorney in Indiana is a competent witness, even where his
client is a party to the proceedings. In Kintz v. R. J. Menz Lumber Co.,
an action to recover on an account for goods sold and delivered to. defendant, plaintiff's counsel was the sole witness. 35 Acknowledging that
the practice of admitting an attorney's testimony in his client's behalf
has often been denounced and is not to be encouraged, the court nevertheless condoned it as imperative in this situation. 30 The record disclosed
that no other witness to the transaction was present at the trial. No
absolute prohibition against adducing such evidence has evolved because
of judicial confidence that lawyers will scrupulously respond to a judge's
admonition that they refrain from testifying unless absolutely necessary.
Where a trial court improperly. directs a lawyer to testify as to
37
confidential communications, a reviewing court will grant a new trial.
Under the supreme court rules, an attorney's oath contains a provision
that he will "preserve inviolate" the confidence of his client. 38 His professional status may be jeopardized by an unwarranted revelation of
privileged comn-'unications. 89 Hence, the attorney's proper course of
action, rather than complying with the unreasonable judicial command, is
to submit to a contempt citation.
A final consideration regarding the attorney-client privilege is the
extent of the latter's power of waiver. Unquestionably the privilege
inheres in the client and can be waived only with his consent. However,
such waiver can be implied from the client's own testimony concerning
the confidential communication."0 As to deceased clients, two rules are
35. 47 Ind.App. 475, 94 N.E. 802 (1932).
36. Nowhere is an attorney made absolutely incompetent. 58 A i. JUR., WITNESSES
§ 152. It is contrary to professional ethics, however, for counsel to testify in a case
which he is conducting for one of the parties. 58 id. § 153; Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the A.B.A., No. 19. The public is likely to lose much respect for,
and confidence in, the profession because of a belief that a testifying attorney will
distort the truth in favor of his client. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1911. Exceptions are
made where counsel testifies as to purely formal matters, Canons of Professional
Ethics; or where his testimony is essential, Kintz v. R. J. Menz Lumber. Co., supra
note 35; or where his integrity has been subjected to attack and he takes the stand to
defend himself, Doll v. Loesel, 288 Pa. 527, 136 Atl. 796 (1927) ; Cooper v. United States,
5 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1925).
37. George v. Hurst, 31 Ind. App. 660, 68 N.E. 1031 (1903).
38. Rule 3-20, RULES OF THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT. Rule 3-21 provides
for disciplinary proceedings, which may result in disbarment or suspension. The prescribed duties of an attorney contain a provision similar to Rule 3-20. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 4-3608 (Burns, 1933).
39. Thus, in a recent proceeding, In re Lane, 223 Ind. 94, 57 N.E.2d 773 (1944), an
attorney was disbarred by the supreme court for, inter alia, utter disregard of the ethical
standards of Rule 3-20.
40. Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132, 143 (1873); Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112 (1873).
If a client reveals a confidentialcommunication to his attorney, the lawyer can testify

NOTES
noteworthy: the privilege may be waived by the decedent's personal representative ;41 and a presumption is indulged that selection of an attorney as
an attesting witness manifests a testator's intention to waive to the
42
extent that the attorney may legitimately authenticate the will.

An exclusion which" has provoked considerable litigation and much
academic criticism is the physician-patient privilege. 43 An excerpt from
the leading Indiana case indicates the customary position of courts recognizing this relationship: "The purpose of the statute is not the suppression of truth needed for reaching correct results in litigation, though
this may sometimes incidentally occur . . . but the purpose is the

promotion and protection of confidence of a certain kind, the inviolability
of which is deemed of more importance than the results sought through
compulsory disclosure in a court of justice." 44 Here, too, the courts
construe the statute as creating a privilege although it is phrased in
terms of competency. 4 5 Persuasive argumenfs have been advanced for
to the entire subject matter discussed. Fluty v. State, 224 Ind. 652, 659, 71 N.E.2d
565, 567 (1946) ; see 20 MAss. L.Q. (No. 3) 16 (1935) and 33 YALE L.J. 782 (1924).
41. Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341, 344, 21 N.E. 918, 919 (1889).
42. Pence v. Waugh, 135 Ind. 143, 155, 34 N.E. 860, 864 (1893).
43. At common law information given a physician stood upon no better legal
footing than private confidences generally, which were not privileged. New York, followed by about half of the states, created the privilege by statute to conform to the
physician's ethical canon of secrecy: ". .'. [W]hatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which
ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be
as sacred secrets." Hippocratic Oath, ENcyc. BRiTANNICA, Vol. 15, p. 198 (1946).
The privilege was supposedly based on the theory that the personal privacy of a
patient's body and physical condition was entitled to be respected. Its real support,
however, se~ms to be the weight of professional medical opinion pressing upon the legislature; doctors claim that, since the secrets of the legal profession are inviolable, the
confidences of the medical profession deserve equal consideration. The purpose of the
statutes is allegedly to encourage patients to fully disclose their ailments to attending
physicians without apprehension that their statements may be revealed upon the witness.
stand to their humiliation and disgrace. ComisrssioNmS ON REvIsioN OF THE STATUTES
OF NEW YoRx, Vol. III, p. 737 (1836).
44. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885); this decision
was discussed in a recent Indiana case, Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496
(1948). The appellate court decision in the Stayner case was challenged in Note, 23
IND. L.J. 295 (1948); the supreme court thereafter reversed the lower court's opinion,
citing the Journal note in support of its views. For a thorough examination of the
physician-patient privileie in Indiana see this note and the Stayner case.
45. The general rules governing privileged communications between attorney and
client are applicable by analogy to physician and patient. Myers v. State; 192 Ind. 592,
601, 137 N.E. 547, 550 (1922). Communications are not confidential where third persons
are present. Springer v. Byram, 137 Ind. 15, 23, 36 N.E. 361, 363 (1893); General Acc.,
Fire, & Life Assur. Co. v. Tibbs, 102 Ind. App. 262, 268, 2 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1936). The
privilege belongs to the patient and can be waived by him or his personal representatives. Stayner v. Nye, supra note 44; Scott v. Smith, 171 Ind. 453, 457, 85 N.E.
774, 775 (1908) ; Heaston v. Krieg, 167 Ind. 101, 115, 77 N.E. 805, 809 (1906) ; Lane v.
Boicourt, 228 Ind. 420, 428, 27 N.E. 1111, 1112 (1891). ItcannQt be invoked by a
physician charged with a crime, or by a patient suing for malpractice. Hauk v. State,
148 Ind. 238, 260, 46 N.E. 127, 134, 47 N.E. 465 (1897) ; Lane v. Boicourt, supra. This
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restricting or entirely eliminating this exclusion. 46 Such proposals have
had a conspicuous impact on modern industrial accident legislation, where
47
the privilege invariably is abrogated.
In several notable instances the Indiana courts have expanded or
restricted the scope of this concession. An early case extended the legislative deference to encompass the partner of an attending physician. 48
The court maintained that the physician's associate came within the
spirit, if not the letter, of the statute. More recently, the wife of an
unconscious patient imparted to her husband's physician information
regarding the cause, origin and history of his ailment. 4 9 Again the
court enlarged the privilege. In Mathews v.' Rex Health and Accident
Insurance Co., the court broadened the rule that information acquired
during an autopsy by a physician who attended the deceased before death
was privileged because the autopsy was an integral part of the treatment.
This exclusion was held to embrace knowledge obtained in a post mortem
by a doctor who had never attended the patient. 50 The court rationalized
this extension on the ground that the physician was employed by the
hospital in which deceased was a patient at the time of his death. In
the midst of these deleterious decisions have emerged a few commendable
instances of judicial limitation. For example, the supreme court admitted testimony of the superintendent of a gymnastic and orthopedic
institute as to a patient's physical deformity. 51 Holding that the witness
was not a physician, the court rationalized that, since the provision was
in derogation of the common law, it should not be strained beyond its
rule would also apply to an attorney charged with crime or aiding a client in contempla-

tion of a crime or fraud. Missouri Real Estate & Loan Co. v. Gibson, 282 Mo. 75, 220
S.W. 675 (1920).
46. The communication of a patient to his doctor is seldom intended to be con-

fidential; and, even where it is, no one is likely to be deterred from seeking medical
treatment because of the possibility of its disclosure in court. Concerning the analogy
to the attorney-client privilege, it can be said that the services of an attorney are sought
primarily for aid in litigation, while those of a physician are sought for physical cure.

Hence the rendering of legal advice would result more directly and surely in disclosure
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a.

of the client's admissions if there were no privilege.

47. "No fact communicated to . . . any physician . . . who may have attended...
the employee . . . shall be privileged . . . in the hearings provided for in this act. . .
IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 40-1227 (Burns, 1933).

48. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dewing, Adm'r., 123 Ind. 384, 390, 24 N.E. 86, 88, 24 N.E.

375 (1889).
49. North American Union v. Oleska, 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1916).
50. 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927), noted in 3 NOTRE DAtE
(1927).
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51. William Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 488, 90 N.E. 1014, 1018, 92
N.E. 337 (1910). The court discussed cases from several jurisdictions with statutes
similar to that in Indiana, in which privilege was not applied to men in professions
similar to medicine: Hendershot v. Western Union Tel. Co., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N.W.
828 (1898) (veterinary surgeon) ; People v. DeFrance, 104 Mich. 563, 62 N.W. 709
(1895) (dentist) ; Brown v. Hannibal, T. Co., 66 Mo. 588 (1877) (druggist).
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literal meaning. And in Indianapolis & Martinsville Rapid Transit Co.
v. Reeder, Adm'r., a physician was permitted to testify as to involuntary
manifestations of pain by his client, on the theory that such expressions
were not intended to be confidential. 52 While Indiana courts fortunately
have circumvented the inaccurate designation of the competency statute,
they have not accomplished the extensive confinement of the privilege
which its limited justification warrants.
Few controversies have involved the priest-penitent privilege. Although there was no equivalent legal relationship at common law, in very
few instances was a clergyman required to testify as to confidences communicated to him by a penitent. 53 Today more than half the states, in54
cluding Indiana, have adopted legislation creating this exclusion.
Indiana cases reflect the conventional limitations placed upon the privilege. 55 The authorities have uniformly recognized the priest-penitent
doctrine, although its necessity has never been demonstrated and its acceptance is incompatible with the modern theories concerning admissibility.50 However, little advantage apparently would be gained by,requiring admission of a penitent's confession, and the policy underlying
protection of religious freedom is a strong one. Seldom will a case arise
in which the only evidence against a defendant is his confession to a
clergyman. Even Bentham, who vigorously opposed most privileges,
accepted this one. 5 7
In contrast with priest and penitent, the marital privilege has been
productive of numerous perplexing disputes. The legislature and courts
have combined to confound these issues in Indiana.5" The original
52. 37 Ind. App. 262, 76 N.E. 816 (1905).
53. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2395.

54. Ibid.
55. Only statements made in obedience to some supposed religious duty are

privileged. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).

The statute does not prevent a minister

from testifying to such matters as the mental condition of the penitent. Buuck v.
Kruckeberg, 95 N.E.2d 304 (Ind. App. 1950).
56. MODEL CODE oF EVIDENCE, Rule 219 (1942); WIGMOR'S CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 217 (2d ed. 1935).
57. JERE.M Y BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDIciAL EvIDENCE, bk. IX, pt. II, c. VI
(1827) (Bowring's ed., Vol. VIII, p. 367, 1843).
58. Amidst the complexity a few settled rules stand out. Husband or wife
cannot testify as to communications made to each other during marriage, nor can they
testify to such after the relationship has ceased. Dwigans v. State, 222 Ind. 434, 436,
54 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1943) ; Higham v. Vanosdol, 101 Ind. 160, 162 (1884) ; Dye v. Davis,
65 Ind. 474, 481 (1879). Where it was obviously not intended to be confidential, a
communication is ,not privileged; e.g., where made in presence of a third person.
Reynolds v. State, 147 Ind. 3, 8, 46 N.E. 31, 33 (1896); Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527,
23 N.E. 1097 (1889) ; Gebbart v. Burkett, 57 Ind. 378, 384 (1877) ; Mercer v. Patterson,
41 Ind.,440, 444 (1872). Authority given by a wife to her husband to transact her
business is not confidential. Schmied v. Frank, 86 Ind. 250, 257 (1882). Court prdperly

allowed a statement of negotiations between spouses that resulted in conveyance of land,
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competency statute, codifying the common law rule, not only excluded
their confidential communications but also made spouses incompetent to
testify for or against one another. 5 9 The General Assembly dispensed
with the latter disqualifications in 1881. Thereafter, husband and wife
were only "incompetent" as to communications made to each other. As
has been indicated, the other relationships in the exceptive statute are
actually privileged in judicial contemplation. As to the marital relation,
however, the courts inexplicably have construed the statute literally, holding that a spouse is actually incompetent to testify as to confidential
communications.6"
Interpretation of "communications" in the Indiana statute poses a
delicate problem. While it is not explicitly stipulated, the purpose of the
act is acknowledged to be protection of marital confidences.6 1 However,
the boundaries of "confidential communications" are nebulous, to say the
least. Most jurisdictions have generously conceded that this category
includes all information or knowledge privately imparted by one spouse
to the other by virtue of the marital relation, through acts, signs, and
Beitman v. Hopkins, 109 Ind. 177, 178, 9 N.E. 720 (1887); cf. Gifford v. Gifford, 58
Ind. App. 665, 672, 107 N.E. 308, 311 (1914). In divorce suit a wife could testify as
to her conduct as a wife, her husband's habits of intoxication, and his abuse of her.
Smith v. Smith, 77 Ind. 80, 82 (1881).
59. The multitude of Indiana Supreme Court opinions reviewing the disqualifica-

tion of husband and wife as witnesses for or against each other had as their main
objective the determination of the interest of the witness in the proceedings. If it were
decided that the witness was actually testifying in his own behalf, then the incompetency was nonexistent. E.g., Morgan v. Hyatt, 62 Ind. 560 (1878) ; Kingen v. State,
50 Ind. 557 (1875); Bennifield v. Hypres, 38 Ind. 498 (1872); Bonham v. Keen, 40
Ind. 197 (1872) ; Gee v. Lewis, 20 Ind. 149 (1863). It was early settled that this
disability ended upon death of one spouse or after one had obtained a divorce. Woolley
v. Turner, 13 Ind. 253 (1859). Taulman v. State, 37 Ind. 353 (1871), "contains dicta
to the effect that a wife may be a witness against her husband in cases for surety of
the peace, assault and battery, and other similar instances.
60. While the decisions have inconsistently referred to "communication . . . not
within the privilege," no case allowing waiver by either spouse has been discovered. The
only possible inference is that the courts actually treat confidences between husband and
wife as absolutely inadmissible.
The reasons for the language used by the legislature and the interpretation put
upon the statute by the courts are readily inferrable. In all probability competency
and privilege situations were combined under the term "incompetent" due to inadvertence;
and perhaps the need for clarity was subordinated to the General Assembly's desire to
compress the statutory mandates. The judicial interpretation may be attributable to the
fact that the courts have always construed the statute in light of the 1852 provisions first
enumerating privilege situations. Although the 1861 enactment incorporated all the
relationships (attorney-client, physician-patient, priest-penitent, and husband-wife) in one
section, much as they are today, an 1863 decision reverted to the language of the 1852
provisions: ".

.

. the term, 'confidential communications' . . . seems limited to matters

confided to attorneys, physicians, and clergymen; and, if so the authority to waive
objection to their disclosure, does not extend to matters between husband and wife."
Bevins v. Cline's Adm'r., 21 Ind. 37, 43 (1863) ; and see note 4 supra.
61. See note 58 supra.
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spoken or written words. 62 An early Indiana case apparently conforms to
the majority view in conferring this excessively" broad privilege. 63 In
Smith v. State, however, the court attained a more sophisticated perspective, asserting that conduct, to gain refuge under the statute, must
be characterized by that intimacy peculiar to the married state. 64 The
manner in which the communicator's acts were performed indicated that
they were not intended to be confidential; such intent must be demonstrated by the party claiming the privilege. In this instance the Indiana
court applied a test more commensurate with the policy underlying the
privilege than do those tribunals which arbitrarily maintain that all acts
done in the presence of the spouse are privileged. The Indiana rule
adequately safeguards the marital relation without unduly subordinating
the objective of confining exclusionary rules.
Prior to 1881, one spouse was absolutely disqualified from testifying
for or against the other except in the case of assault and battery, or a
similar offense, committed against the witness spouse. A leading decision under the modem statute, which discontinues this "for and
against" limitation, reflects the influence of the exception on confidential
communications. 5 The husband was charged with forgery. The state
introduced his wife's testimony to prove that defendant had coerced her
signature on a promissory note. The husband's objection to his wife's
competency, on the ground that her testimony subverted the marital
relationship, was overruled. 66 The court observed that if the husband
was accusing the wife of complicity, she could testify as an injured party
62. E.g., People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949) ; Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949).
63. Perry v. Randall, 83 Ind. 143 (1882). Defendant found money in his home.
Plaintiff, claiming he had lost the money while visiting defendant, brought an action
to recover it. The trial court admitted testimony by defendant's wife as to his actions
upon discovering the money. She avoided the statement of a single word spoken to her
by defendant. The supreme court held that the husband's actions were confidential
communications to his wife, and therefore she was not competent to testify in regard
to them.
64. 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926). Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder of his grandmother; one of errors on which he appealed was admission- of
his wife's testimony to the effect that she saw him empty something from a trunk
through the floor of an outhouse. Defendant claimed that his acts were confidential
communications to his wife, since they resulted in information acquired by virtue of
the marriage relation. See Recent Case Notes, 2 IND. LJ.188 (1926) ; 26 COL. L. REv.
897 (1926).
65. Beyerline v. State, 147 Ind. 125, 45 N.E. 772 (1897).
66. In allowing the testimony the court said, "Where the criminal, 'in seeking
advice and consolation, lays open his heart to his wife, the law regards the sacredness
of their relation and will not permit her to make known what he has thus communicated,
even as it will not ask him to disclose it himself. But if what is said or done by either
has no relation to their mutual trust and confidence as husband and wife, then the
reason for secrecy ceases." Id. at 130, 45 N.E. at 774.
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under the criminal competency statute.6 7 Alternatively, if she was an
"abused and maltreated wife," the marital relation had no connection
with the husband's- misconduct. 68 Thus, the unique Indiana marital communications disqualification is subject to a limitation commonly imposed
upon the husband-wife privilege, in other jurisdictions.
A different aspect of the marital relationship is that of competency
of a mother to testify as to non-access of her husband in a filiation or
bastardy proceeding, charging another with the support of her child.
Brief recourse to the common law background of this problem will illustrate the historical influences on its modern statutory development. 69 In
1734, Lord Hardwicke arbitrarily declared, in a filiation proceeding,
that, due to the wife's interest in relieving her husband of the burden,
it was improper to charge a child's maintenance against a defendant on
the strength of the mother's uncorroborated testimony. Equally dogmatic, Lord Mansfield 43 years later announced as the law of England,
"founded in decency, morality, and policy," that neither spouse was
competent to bastardize the wife's issue by testifying to non-access. This
doctrine, as against husband and wife, conclusively presumed legitimacy
of the child. In the United States the courts initially favored Lord Hardwicke's rule, but it has long since been repudiated in most jurisdictions in
favor of the Mansfield view. The latter has been rationalized on the
ground that it is indecent to allow a person to testify to an illicit connection and immoral to permit a parent to be instrumental in obliterating
his own child's legal status.' 0
The general competency statute of one jurisdiction has been interpreted to reject the common law rules and qualify the mother of an
illegitimate child to testify even as to non-access. 71 In Evans v. State,
the Indiana Supreme Court likewise rejected a contention that neither
67. "The following persons are competent witnesses:
First. All persons who are competent to testify in civil actions.
Second. The party injured by the offense committed.
Third. Accomplices, when they consent to testify.
Fourth. The defendant, to testify in his own behalf... ." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1603
(Burns, 1933).
68. Doolittle v. State, 93 Ind. 272 (1883).
69. For a complete history and examination of this situation, see Evans v. State
ex rel. Freeman, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N.E. 244, 75 N.E. 651 (1905) ; 7 Azi. JUR., BASTARDS
§ 21; 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2063 and 2064; 37 HAxv. L. REv. 916 (1924); 19

ILL. L. REV. 280 (1924).

70. Professor Wigmore cites evidentiary principles that demonstrate the basis

for this rule to be "utterly artificial" and of a "false nature." He claims that ". . . these

high-sounding 'decencies' and 'moralities' are mere pharisaical afterthoughts, invented to
explain a rule otherwise incomprehensible, and lacking support in the established facts
and policies of our law. There never was any true precedent for the rule; and there

is just as little reason of policy to maintain it." 7

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

71. State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 533, 233 N.W. 300 (1930).

§ 2064.

NOTES
the Hardwicke nor Mansfield rule should be adopted. 72 Instead the court
relied on an early case, Cuppy v.State,73 which had upheld an Indiana
statute rendering relatrix a competent witness in a bastardy proceeding.7 4
This decision construed an original 1852 enactment to abolish the common law rule precluding a wife's testimony as to non-access. In the Evans
case, the court discerned in the 1881 reenactment legislative acquiescence
in the Cuppy decision. As to the prerequisite of corroboration, the Evans
doctrine dismissed it with the observation that the weight of the mother's
testimony, as that of other competent witnesses, is left to the jury.7 5 All
previous non-access legislation in Indiana was superseded in 1941 by a
new statutory scheme, providing for the determination of support of
children born out of wedlock. 76 Nevertheless, two opinions construing the
recent statutes characterize Evans v. State, as the "modern doctrine."' 77
Indiana is apparently one of few jurisdictions having initiated an improved rule calculated to elicit rather than suppress the truth on the
issue of non-access.
The most recent addition to statutory privilege in Indiana is a 1941
provision, amended in 1949, protecting newspapers, radio, and television
stations from disclosing the sources of information disseminated by
them. 78 This exclusionary principle, while it has gained legislative recognition in more than a dozen states, 7 9 is in sharp conflict with the temperament of modern thinking in the field of evidence. Several states have declined to enact similar provisions and the American Bar Association has
criticized their passage. Nevertheless, the Indiana General Assembly has
preferred the policy of encouraging disclosure of information to media
of mass communication over that of adducing all evidence essential to
jtist disposition of legal controversies. 80
72. 165 Ind. 369, 74 N.E. 244, 75 N.E. 651 (1905).
73. 24 Ind. 389 (1865); the court also relied on Dean v. State ex rel. Marrical,
29 Ind. 483 (1868).
74. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-602 and 3-604 (Bums' 1933).
75. The court did mellow the rule with a few words of warning: "The prevailing
presumption that a child born in wedlock -is legitimate is a just and salutary rule that
should not be lightly regarded .... [T]he court should always carefully scrutinize the
testimony of a married woman and . . .proof of the principal fact (as to non-access)
• . . should be direct, clear and convincing to justify the court in charging the
defendant, and in placing a badge of dishonor upon the unoffending offspring of the
mother." 165 Ind. at 376, 75 N.E. at 652.
76. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-630, 3-638 (Burns, Cum. Supp. 1951).
77. Pilgrim v. Pilgrim, 118 Ind. App. 6, 12, 75 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1947) ; Pursley v.
Hisch, 119 Ind. App. 232, 237, 85 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1948).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (Burns, Cum. Supp. 1949).
79. 8 WIGAORE. EVIDENCE § 2286.
80. See Note, 17 IND. L.J. 162 (1941), questioning the constitutionality of the
statute's classification of newspapers which can avail themselves of the privilege.
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Important policy considerations are raised by the Indiana "Dead
Man Statutes." S' In 1852, the legislature discontinued exclusion of witnesses due to interest. In 1861, incompetency of a party also was
eliminated. However, provisions then added render incompetent the
survivor to a transaction when he is an adverse claimant against the
estate of a deceased person. These enactments were prompted by the
General Assembly's apprehension that, in the absence of disqualification
for interest, the motive of personal gain, coupled with the opportunity to
misrepresent offered by the decedent's death, would be sufficient to create
a serious threat of fictitious claims against estates.8 2- As a result of the
"Dead Man Statutes," the facility with which living claimants may establish honest demands is sacrificed to discourage survivors, who might take
advantage of their favorable positions with respect to prior transactions,
from despoiling the estates of the dead. Although criticism of this legislation has been severe, few jurisdictions have initiated reform measures.8 3
81.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§§ 2-1715, 2-1716,2-1717, 2-1718,2-1719 (Burns, 1933). The first

portion of §2-1715 is illustrative, of the language of all five sections: "In suits or
proceedings in which an executor or administrator is a party, involving matters which
occurred during the lifetime of the decedent, where a judgment or allowance may be
made or rendered for or against the estate represented by such executor or administrator,
any person who is a necessary party to the issue or record, whose interest is adverse to
such estate, shall not be a competent witness as to such matters against such estate ..
"
This section, however, allows testimony where a deposition has been taken from the
decedent, or where he had previously testified to the matter.
82. While the policy considerations involved in survivor disqualifications are not undrily obscure, courts often have failed to articulate them clearly, proffering instead such
facile rationalizations as, "if death has closed the lips of the one party, the policy of
the law is to close the lips of the other." Louis's Adm'r. v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470 (1873);
see Taylor v. Duesterberg, 109 Ind. 165, 171, 9 N.E. 907, 910 (1887).
83. The Legal Research Committee of the New York Commonwealth Fund has
embodied the arguments against statutory survivor disqualifications in its study of several
major problems in the field of evidence. MORGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM C. III (1927).
(1) Any living witness who can shed light upon
a fact in issue should be heard to state what he knows. Few dishonest witnesses can
deceive the court and jury. (2) A claimant corrupt enough to commit perjury would
not hesitate to suborn perjury. (3) The argument in Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88
(1878), that a contrary rule "would place in great peril the estates of the dead" is
based on superficial reasoning. Every day the present rule jeopardizes the honest claims
of the living. (4) Two arguments nullify the claim that it is unfair to permit the
survivor to testify when the lips of the decedent are sealed: the contention overlooks
the fact that the court and jury will judiciously scrutinize the testimony of the survivor; it assumes that the only fair thing to do is seal the lips of the survivor, without
considering the alternative of admitting in evidence self-serving declarations of the
decedent. (5) Experience in nine states proves the fallacy of the assertion that public
sentiment would not tolerate a rule making the survivor competent. 46 HARV. L. REV.
834 (1933).
The Conmonwealth Fund Committee has recommended a relatively brief statutory
provision which might advantageously replace all five sections of Indiana's Dead Man
Statutes. The proposed statute first eliminates all disqualification due to interest and
then allows in evidence statements of the decedent to counteract the survivor's testimony.
Adoption of this provision has been recommended by the A.B.A. COMMITTEE ONzEviDENCE,

63

ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssociATioN

581 (1938),

NOTES
Both theory and experience justify abolition of the rtile excluding testimony of an interested survivor, and establishment of the principle that
84
all relevant statements of the decedent are admissible.
Non-statutory Privilegeand Competency. Testimonial competency of
judge, juror, and court reporter is affected by their peculiar relation to the
tribunal. The latter may be summarily dismissed with the observation
that it is contrary to public policy to require the reporter to serve as a
witness in a trial in which he is functioning inhis official capacity, since
this would necessitate disruption of his duties and the record of the trial
would be incomplete.8 5 Similar factors enter into consideration of judges
as witnesses. Two distinct situations arise: the judge may be called to
testify in a trial over which he is presiding; or he may be summoned to
appear in another tribunal as any other witness. In the former, sound
arguments militate persuasively against permitting the judge to testify.
Proper exercise of the separate functions of judge and witness are incompatible. For example, the judge would be placed in the paradoxical
situation of ruling on objections to his own testimony. The jury would
be inclined to accord inordinate weight to his evidence. Any subjection
to the vicissitudes of cross examination would impair judicial prestige.
Accordingly most jurisdictions have concluded that a judge cannot testify
at a trial over which he is presiding." Since the difficulties are substantially alleviated when the testifying judge is not on th6 bench, Indiana
has satisfactorily solved the dilemma by statutory provision for change of
venue where "the judge of the court wherein such action is pending is
84. Two provisions in addition to the Dead Man Statutes have survived abolition
of the common law disqualification for interest. The first excluded one spouse where
the other is not competent in his own behalf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1720 (Burns, 1933) ;
Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, 189 Ind. 507, 513, 127 N.E. 766, 768 (1920) ; Terry v.
Davenport, 185 Ind. 561, 577, 112 N.E. 998, 1003 (1916) ; Belledin v. Gooley, 157 Ind.
49, 60 N.E. 706 (1901) ; Scherer v. Ingerman, Adm'r., 110 Ind. 428, 443, 11 N.E. 8, 12
N.E. 304 (1886) ; Gilbert v. Estate of Swain, 9 Ind. App. 88, 36 N.E. 374 (1893). The
other provides that where an insane person is a party to a suit, neither he nor his
adversary shall be competent as to matters which occurred prior to the appointment
of a guardian. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1721 (Burns, 1933). When the General Assembly
abolishes the Dead Man Statutes, the legislators should also reconsider these sections
to determine whether or not they are based on sound reason stronger than the arguments
against them. See premises in note 83 supra.
85. Where the official shorthand reporter has taken notes of evidence, he may
read them at a subsequent trial. Bass v. State, 136 Ind. 165, 169, 36 N.E. 124, 125
(1893); Meyer v. Garvin, Rec., 110 Ind. App. 403, 416, 37 N.E.2d 291, 296 (1941);
Houk v. Branson, 17 Ind. App. 119, 122, 45 N.E. 78, 79 (1896).
86. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. A. 1946, § 1883; 58 Am. JUR., WITNESSES § 150; 6
WIGMAOI, EVIDENCE § 1909. At a recent military trial a member of the court testified
for the prosecution. It did not appear that he withdrew from duty as a participant in
the tribunal. A reviewing court held that the court was not legally constituted and
the proceedings were vitiated. C.M. 220693 (1942) ; 1 BULL. OF U.S. J.A.G. (Army) 12
(1942).
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a material witness."' 7 In Wood v. Pogue, the appellate court held that
a judge from whom a change of venue was taken was qualified to testify,
since he was not included in the statutory enumeration of incompetent
witnesses.""
Critics of the judge as a witness under any circumstances point out
that his attendance at a separate tribunal detracts valuable time from the
proceedings in his own court, thus overloading already crowded dockets;
as well as that his testimony will be accorded undue weight by the jury
and that the judicial dignity may be impaired by interrogating a judge and
subjecting his credibility to question. These objections must be weighed
against the public interest in obtaining all facts which are material to the
issues on trial. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the judge
presiding over a prior stage of the litigation "stood upon exactly the
same footing as any other witness."18 9 Conflicting policies might more
appropriately be reconciled by bestowing on judges the privilege to refuse
to appear and testify, unless the court determines that the importance of
his testimony eclipses the reasons for conferring the privilee.9°
Also occupying a special status in the law of privilege and competency because of association with the tribunal is the juror. Several
facets of the problem are worthy of investigation. Since not embraced
within the exceptive statute, jurors are competent as witnesses. 91 Because of the awkwardness of examining a juror, difficulties similar to
those surrounding the presiding judge problem are encountered. Few attorneys would jeopardize rapport with the jury by cross examining or
attempting to impeach one of their number. In addition, the witness-juror
would enjoy an undue advantage when arguing in the jury room. 92 A
practicable solution is to discover on voir dire that a juror has information concerning the controverted issues and to dismiss him from the
panel if he is desired as a witness.
Another aspect of the juror's testimonial capacity is his competency
to impeach the verdict. 93 The typical rule, holding the juror incompetent,
has-been justified by the Indiana Supreme Court as follows: "To permit
87. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1401 (Burns, 1933).
88. 103 Ind. App. 577, 599, 5 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (1937).
89. State v. Hindman, 159 Ind. 586, 593, 65 N.E. 911, 913 (1902) ; accord, State v.
Duffy, 57 Conn. 525, 18 Atl. 791 (1889).
90. Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Me. 85 (1843); Hale v. Wyatt, 78 N.H. 214, 98
Atl. 379 (1916).
91. In Curtis v. Burney, 55 Ga. App. 552, 190 S.E. 866 (1937), a juror was
considered the same as any other witness.
92. MIssouRi BAR, PROPOSED EVIDENCE CODE § 5.03, (1948).
93. Dunn v. Hall, 8 Blackf. 32 (Ind. 1846) ; Barlow v. State, 2 Blackf. 114 (Ind.
1827); Indianapolis Power & Eight Co. v. Moore, 103 Ind. App. 521, 536, 5 N.E.2d
118, 124 (1937).
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members of the jury, after the return of a verdict, to thus impeach it,
would present to the unsuccessful party a strong temptation to tamper
with jurors, and open a wide door to corruption." 94 However, this rule
subsequently has been misapplied in a case in which defendant moved to
correct the answer to an interrogatory by changing it fromn "yes" to
"no." 9 5 He based his contention on affidavits of all the jurors to the effect
that their intent to answer in the negative was thwarted by clerical error.
Rigorously applying the impeachment rule, the court rejected the affidavits with the observation that interrogatories and answers thereto are
analogous to a special verdict. Most jurisdictions receive statements of
jurors, before or after separation, for the purpose of correcting mechanical error. 90 The Indiana decision reflects the compound hypothesis
that jurors are so likely amenable to unscrupulous overtures of unsuccessful litigants that they might be induced to issue perjured refutations of
the original verdict. These doubtful assumptions should not be invoked
to preclude correction of clerical error in a jury's verdict. 97
In general, rules applicable to petit jurors are equally germane to
the competency of grand jurors. The grand jurors' oath, however, forbids the disclosure of any "evidence given or proceeding had before
them."'9g Several Indiana cases have held that this does not prevent proof
by one of the jurors of what transpired in their presence. 99 Although
not articulated in the opinions, the doctrine rests on the sound basis that
secrecy must yield to disclosure when the latter becomes of tantamount
importance to administration of justice.100
A privilege universally accorded to law enforcement officers is that
of reftising to reveal the identity of their informants. 1 1 One of the
94. Haun v. Wilson, 28 Ind. 296, 299 (1867).
95. McKinley v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Ind. 375, 21 N.E. 36 (1888).
96. E.g., State v. Hargett, 196 N.C. 692, 146 S.E. 801 (1929) ; Randall v. Peerless
Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 352, 99 N.E. 221 (1912) and cases cited therein.
97. Relevant to a discussion of petit jurors is the proposal that a privilege be
conferred based on the relationship between jurors. See the discussion .of this
proposition by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932) ; also
see 8 WIGAoRE, EvmENcE § 2345.
98. IND. ANN. STAT. §9-807 (Burns, 1933); and see IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-816,
9-817, 9-818 (Burns, 1933).
99. Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 375, 47 N.E. 157, 170 (1896); Burdick v. Hunt,
43. Ind. 381, 389 (1873) ; Shattuck v. State, 11 Ind. 473, 478 (1858); Burnham v. Hatfield, 5 Blackf. 21 (Ind. 1838).
100. E.g., Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 406 (1922);
State v. Putnam, 53 Or. 266, 100 Pac. 2 (1909) ; State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 65 N.W.
1010 (1896).
101. Akin to this privilege are the ones granted to government officials, to refuse
to disclose confidential information, designated state secrets, and official communications.
While authorities have debated
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rules 227 and 228 (1942).
the propriety of this immunity, the courts have generally upheld legislation conferring
it, leaving to the legislature determination of its wisdom. Several provisions exist in
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earliest decisions recognizing this rule in the United States was an Indiana case, Oliver v. Pate.10 2 Withholding the identity of an informer
was explicitly posited on the attorney-client privilege, however. 10 3 The
United States Supreme Court later cited this holding with approval and
indicated the correct rationale of the privilege.10 4 The identity is not
suppressed for the protection of the witness or party in the particular
prosecution, but rather on the ground that such disclosures should be
encouraged. In order to elicit confidences, police must be authorized to
insure exemption from compulsory disclosure of informants' identities.
The privilege is limited by the court's discretion to require admission if
the evidence is deemed essential to assure a fair determination of defendant's guilt or innocence. 10 5
A well-established common law privilege relates to offers to compromise between adverse parties to a civil action. Louisville, New Albany,
and Chicago Ry. v. Wright, a leading decision on the point, has precisely
articulated the significant distinction in the Indiana cases. 1 6 An "offer or
proposition" for a compromise is privileged. But admission of an independent fact, not connected with the offer, although it occurs during a
conference calculated to produce a settlement, is competent evidence.
Later decisions in Indiana merely examine the facts in the particular
case to determine whether the offered testimony was a proposal to compromise or" was the statement of an independent, unqualified fact. 10 7
Indiana conferring a privilege to withhold official information. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 40-1507 (Burns, 1933) (Workmen's Compensation Act-accident reports) ; § 47-1920
(Motor Vehicles-accident reports) ; § 65-105 (Taxation-business records). See the
consideration of such a privilege in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Note,
27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952) ; .8 WIGINORE, EViDENCE §§ 2367-2379.
102. 43 Ind. 132 (1873).
103. The court practically recognized the true reason for the rule in the following
statement: "Public policy requires that a person in making communications to a
prosecuting attorney, relative to criminals or persons suspected of being guilty of crime,
should be at liberty to make a full statement to him without fear of disclosure." Id. at
141. Apparently assumiig a need for a more substantial basis for the privilege, the
court utilized the existing attorney-client relationship rather than elaborating on this
public policy rationale.
104. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1883). In addition to citing Oliver v. Pate,
the Court relied on Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872), which contains a
thorough examination of English and early American authority.
105. Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537 (1909) and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 165 N.W. 46 (1928) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 230 (1942); 38 YALE L.J. 117 (1928).
Another accepted governmental privilege is the right of a voter not to disclose
the nature of his vote at a political election unless it was cast illegally.

IND.

CONST.

ART.

2, § 13; Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89 (1871); Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E.
700 (1887) ; and see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 225 (1942).
106. 115 Ind. 378, 390, 16 N.E. 145, 151, 17 N.E. 584 (1888).
107. McCrum v. McCrum, 36 Ind. App. 636, 639, 76 N.E. 415, 416 (1905); Steeg
v. Walls, 4 Ind. App. 18, 30 N.E. 312 (1891) ; Hood v. Tyner, 3 Ind. App. 51, 28 N.E.
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The basis of the privilege is that the policy of encouraging settlements
will be unduly hampered if evidence of offers to compromise is admitted.
Tender of charitable aid to victims of accidental harm might be discouraged if evidence of such generosity could be received as an implication of the benefactor's legal responsibility. The offer to compromise
does not ordinarily proceed from a specific conviction that an adversary's
claim is well founded.' 08 More often it is believed that further prosecution of the claim, whether legitimate or not, would cause such annoyance
that settlement is preferable. 10 9
Conclusion. Severe exclusionary rulings and the confusing array
of precedents precipitated by Indiana competency and privilege statutes
indicate the need for legislative reform. Since the entire exceptive provision is drafted in teims of absolute disqualification, certain of its components, *properly regarded as privileges, should be accorded separate
treatment. In addition, the General Assembly should consider abrogation
of the "Dead Man Statutes," coupled with initiation of a section admitting declarations of deceased parties, and codification of essential
common law exclusions.
Until thd legislature effectuates these recommendations, the courts
frequently can circumscribe existing privileges by liberally applying the
1033 (1891); accord, Hook v. Bunch, 180 Ill. App. 39 (1913); Kalus v. Bass, 122 Md.
467, 89 Atl. 731 (1914) ; Long v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. 330, 61 Pac. 142 (1900).
108. Schnull v. Cuddy, 36 Ind. App. 262, 267, 74 N.E. 1030, 1032 (1905); 20 Am.
JUR., EVIDENCE §§ 565, 566; 4 WIGmoRx, EViDENcE §§ 1061, 1062; MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE, Rule 309 (1942).

109. Several unique privileges have been proposed by interest groups.
Social Welfare Workers. Courts and legislatures have consistently denied a privilege
to refuse disclosure of case histories and records. The contention is made that communications between welfare workers and their clients meet the requirements of other
privilege relationships. B. B. Re snik and H. G. Balter, Withholding Informatiom From
Law Enforcement Bodies, VIII SociAL SERvicE REv. 688 (1934). It is unlikely, however,
that such a privilege will soon be recognized, since it would require exclusion of
evidence now admissible. The A.B.A. Committee on Evidence voted 28 to 4 against
the recognition of the privilege. 63 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 595 (1938).

Trade Secrets. A privilege conferred upon businessmen not to disclose trade
secrets has had limited acceptance. The provision recommended by the American Law
Institute embodies the contentions of businessmen and also limitations to prevent over
application: "The owner of a trade secret has a privilege . . . to refuse to disclose
the secret and to prevent other persons from disclosing it, if the judge finds that the
allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice."
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 226 (1942); see MissouRi BAR, PROPOSED EVIDENCE
CODE 90 (1948).
An interesting and somewhat perplexing problem may arise where the question of
competency is also the issue on trial. For a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of
this question see Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining
the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L. REv. 392, 408 (1927); also consult Recent
Case Note, 30 H~ARv. L. REv. 87 (1916).
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devices of waiver, -inference, and discretion. Iinplication of waiver from
surrounding circumstances constitutes a potentially effective means of
limiting claims of privilege which unduly obstruct introduction of testimony.1 1 ° Often illogical technicalities have been invoked to substantiate
such claims. For example, although a party calls as witnesses several
physicians who treated him, he can exclude another who was also in
attendance."1 Indiana courts employ an uncompromising rule that judge
and counsel may not comment, nor may the jury draw an unfavorable
inference, against a party who exercises a privilege." 2 Proponents of the
contrary view point out that adverse comment by judge and opposing
attorney does not extinguish the privilege because the unfavorable in3
ference does not fully compensate for loss of the excluded testimony.,Finally, perhaps the most feasible proposal for diminishing the ill-effects
of stringent exclusionary principles would invest the trial judge with
discretion to compel disclosure where the need for the disputed evidence
outweighs the considerations underlying the privilege." 4 Advantages to
be attained by isolated instances of legislative and judicial reform are
indeed significant. However, achievement of. a rational law of privilege
and competency depends ultimately upon willing subordination of technical rules to practical considerations facilitating ascertainment of the
facts in a judicial controversy.
110. Several rules presently exist in Indiana which tend to make waiver effective.
Once a privilege has been waived by the divulgence of information, it can never be
recalled. Stalker v. Breeze, 186 Ind. 221, 225, 114 N.E. 968, 969 (1916). If the question
of competency is not raised on the trial court level it is considered waived. Dime Say. &
Trust Co. v. Jones, 84 Ind. App. 508, 511, 151 N.E. 701, 702 (1925).
111. Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 214 Ind. 394, 14 N.E.2d 561 (1938) ; Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1885) ; see 7 CoRNELL L.Q. 377 (1922) ; 31 YALE
L.J. 529 (1922); 32 YALE L.j. 93 (1922). Since the communications are no longer
confidential, the court appropriately might find a waiver. See 20 CALIF. L. REv. 302
(1932), discussing the California statute, which provides for waiver in such cases.
112. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. 214 Ind. 134, 14 N.E.2d 911
(1938); Brackney v. Fogle, 156 Ind. 535, 60 N.E. 303 (1900). This is in accord with
the weight of authority; McCormick, The Scope of Privilege it the Law of Evidence,
16 TEXAs L. REv. 447, 467 (1938).
113. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 233 (1942).
114. There is tenuous support for such procedure in Indiana in the last portion of
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1718 (Burns, 1933).
One state has already resorted to this device
with respect to the physician-patient relationship, and its adoption has been recommended
by the American Bar Association. The North Carolina statute provides: " . . . Provided
that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such a disclosure if in his opinion
the same is necessary to the .proper administration of justice." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
(Michie, 1943). The Bar Association Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence recommended the enactment of the North Carolina statute because of the amount
of truth suppressed by the statutory privilege and because of the "wholesome flexibility
of the provision." 63 ANNUAL REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION 590 (1938).

